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NOTES
Attorney Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984: If It Works, Don't Fix It
In 1970 Congress drafted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations ("RICO") statute' and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
("CCE") statute.2 Congress drafted both statutes to attack a nationwide
problem that the criminal justice system's laws failed to confront ade-
quately.3 That new problem was organized crime.4 In addition to the
conventional criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment, 5 RICO and
CCE contained a new sanction aimed at organized criminal activities -
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986). RICO was enacted as Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7)(C)
(West Supp. 1987). The CCE provision was enacted as part of Title II of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970).
3 The Senate Judiciary report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stated:
Obviously, the time has come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our economic system
by organized criminal'activities. That attack must begin, however, with a frank recognition
that our present laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeav-
ors or organizations ....
... What is needed here are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but
also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious
threat to the economic well being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their
source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 617]. See also, S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3374
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
4 See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1073; Webb & Turow,
RICO Fo/eiture in Practice: A ProsecutorialPerspective, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 404, 405 (1983). For a defini-
tion of organized crime, see Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in Statutes, and Law Enforcement Admin-
istration, reprinted in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED
CRIME TODAY (1986). "
These statutes are not, however, limited to organized crime. For example, one of RICO's goals
clearly was "to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime," United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981). But Turkette also stated: "In view of the purposes and goals of
the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless con-
fined the reach of the law only to the narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under
RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business." Id. at 590 (emphasis in original). "[RICO applies
to] 'any person'-not just mobsters .... " Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,, 473 U.S. 479,495
(1985). "[IThe fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Id. at 499 (citing Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
5 A RICO conviction subjects a defendant to a possible $25,000 fine and up to twenty year
prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). A CCE conviction is even more painful. That statute provides:
'Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment which may be not less than 10 years and which may be up to life imprison-
ment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provi-
sions of Title 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $5,000,000 if the
deferidant is other than an individual .-. . except that if any person engages in such activity
after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have become final, he shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be
up to life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of twice the amount authorized
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criminal forfeiture. 6 Congress substantially strengthened these forfei-
ture provisions in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 ("1984
Act") .7
Especially after the 1984 amendments,8 the Department of Justice
began to assert that the forfeiture provisions permitted restraining or-
ders that prevented defendants from transferring property subject to for-
feiture to attorneys as payment for legal services. 9 Even if the
government did not obtain a restraining order, it sometimes sought post-
conviction forfeiture of property used to pay attorneys' reasonable
fees.10 The Department's argument has been that if the money used to
pay criminal defense attorneys was derived from or used in a criminal
enterprise, it represents forfeitable ill-gotten gains.i" Congress did not
intend to permit some defendants12 to hire the most expensive lawyers
with the fruits of crime, says the Department, while at the same time at-
tempting to strip these defendants of their economic power.' 3
In contrast, the defense bar and most of the early commentary have
argued that the 1984 Act never intended to subject attorneys' fees to
in accordance with the provisions of Title 18, or $4,000,000 if the defendant is an individual
or $10,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual ....
21 U.S.C. § 848(a).
6 Criminal forfeiture is an in personam post-conviction divestiture of defendants' property inter-
ests used in connection with or derived from criminal enterprise activity. Governments have used
criminal, or in personam forfeiture as a penalty in the form of punishment against persons as a conse-
quence ofjudgments of conviction. An in personam action seeks judgment against persons as distin-
guished from a judgment against property. The government's right to property in an in personam
forfeiture attaches only "by the conviction of the offender." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14
(1827). In contrast, the more common civil or in rem forfeiture acts directly against property, taking
no cognizance of owners or their culpability but determining rights in specific property against all,
equally binding on all. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81, reh 'g
denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
7 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040
(1984).
8 The Justice Department and other agencies have recently engaged in a "concerted effort to
increase the use of forfeiture in narcotics and racketeering cases." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3 at
191-92. See generally, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 90 n.95 (1985) (statistics on RICO and CCE forfeit-
ures from 1970-80).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd in part sub nom., In re
Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) en banc.
10 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, §§ 9-111.000 - .700 (1986), re-
printed in 38 CRIM. L. REP. 3001-08 (BNA) (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL]
(containing the "Justice Department's Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees").
II U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-111.220.
12 An honest discussion must recognize who the defendants are in the attorney fee forfeiture
debate. The vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent and are already granted free represen-
tation. Attorney fee forfeiture has no effect on most white collar offenders, tax evaders, or antitrust
violators. Those criminals will typically pay the market price for representation using untainted
sources of funds. Attorney fee forfeiture affects professional criminals-pimps, gamblers, and drug
dealers. It is the duty of our society to ensure that these criminals get fair trials; some argue that
forfeiture of legal fees guarantees that the trials are not "too fair." See infra note 13.
13 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-111.220. The guidelines cite United States v.
Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Payden]. Payden stated: "[flees paid to attorneys cannot
become a safe harbor from forfeiture of the profits of illegal enterprises. In the same manner that a
defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain
the services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same tainted funds .... To permit this would
undermine the purpose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip offenders and organizations of their
economic power." Id. at 849 n. 14.
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forfeiture.' 4 This group has argued that such an interpretation of the
amendments would effectively violate defendants' rights to counsel' 5 and
due process,' 6 and the presumption of innocence.1 7 Commentators have
also argued that fee forfeiture undermines the institutional role that the
defense lawyer plays in our adversarial system 8 and may force attorneys
into situations that violate the ethics of the legal profession.' 9 At least in
the context of criminal representation, they believe that the statutes' at-
tempts to restrain 20 or sterilize 2' "dirty" money are unconstitutional.
Since the passage of the 1984 amendments, the courts22 and commenta-
tors23 have disagreed over whether Congress intended and constitution-
ally may subject attorneys' fees to forfeiture.
14 See infra note 23.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 74-116.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 122-33.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
18 See, e.g., Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Indi-
vidual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1; Note, RICO and the Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Remov-
ing the Adversary From the Adversarial System?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1987).
19 Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attor-
neys"with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REV. 663, 672-74 (1987) and cases cited therein.
20 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 196.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
22 Many district courts have held that the statute must be read to exempt from forfeiture assets
defendants use to retain attorneys. United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103 (D. W. Va. 1987);
United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986); United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp.
453 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States
v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col.
1985). See also United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982). On the other hand, the
recent courts of appeal decisions, while dividing over the constitutional issues, have generally not
read the 1984 Act to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture. The Fourth Circuit so ruled in In re
Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), as
did the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of the Shop in the Grove
Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988), and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Nichols, 841
F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988). The panel opinion in United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1987) was unanimous on this point, although en banc that court reached a different constitutional
conclusion, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9222, 1988 WL 68784 (2d Cir. 1988). Finally, in United States v.
Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987), the court read the
statute to authorize, although not mandate, an exemption for attorneys' fees. United States v.Jones,
837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988) reaffirmed Thier; unfortunately the Fifth Circuit has since decided to
reconsiderJones en banc, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988).
23 This article is also aided by a wealth of academic discussion on the application of the 1984
criminal forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees. The commentators are as divided as the courts.
Some have concluded that the statute should be read to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture be-
cause of various constitutional concerns. See Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forefei-
ture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747, 776-81 (1985); Viles, Criminal Procedure
IV. Attorneys'Fees Forfiture and Subpoenaing Defendants'Attorneys, 1986 ANN. SuRv. AM. LAw 335 (1986);
Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO: Reform Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. (1986); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to
Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1987); Note,
The Criminal Forfeiture Provisions of the RICO and CCE Statutes: Their Application to Attorneys' Fees, 19 U.
MIcH.J.L. REF. 1199 (1986). Other commentators have concluded that it would be unconstitutional
to apply forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees. See Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying
an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1; Note, Attorney
Fee Forfeiture, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1986); Note, Attorneys' Fee Forteiture Under the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We ProtectAgainst Sham Transfers to Attorneys?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 734
(1987); Comment, RICO and the Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Removing the Adversary from the Adversarial
System?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1987). Some commentators have concluded that the forfeiture of
attorneys' fees is not necessarily unconstitutional but recommend pretrial hearings to determine
which assets are subject to forfeiture. See Pate, Payment of Attorneys' Fees with Potentially Forfeitable
Assets, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 326 (1986); Note, Forfeiture ofAttorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORD-
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This note begins with some background to the fee forfeiture prob-
lem. Part II argues that in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
Congress did not intend that attorneys should receive special treatment.
Neither they nor their fees receive an outright statutory exemption from
possible forfeiture. Part III argues that the forfeiture provisions are con-
stitutionally valid, and that the government may use indictments as sole
support for restraining orders. But the Act also recognizes that while not
necessarily violating the Constitution, attorney fee forfeiture often impli-
cates important constitutional interests. Thus, the Act does not mandate
issuance of restraining orders. Part IV provides a principled interpreta-
tion 24 of the language of the forfeiture statutes that accommodates both
individual defendants constitutional and society's legitimate law enforce-
ment concerns.
I. Background
Prior to 1970, the absence of legislation making "organized crime"
illegal impeded law enforcement officials' attempts to attack it.25 These
officials had in their arsenals only 19th century laws based on a common
law felony view. 26 But the common law felonies-like murder, rape, and
robbery-focused on one offender, one victim, one isolated criminal act.
While the government could prosecute organized crime figures for spe-
cific federal offenses such as theft, extortion, loan sharking, union racke-
teering, interstate gambling, trafficking in drugs, and the like, there was
no punishment for affiliation with a criminal enterprise. 27 The govern-
ment was only finally able to incapacitate one famous racketeer using tax
and liquor laws.
HAM L. REV. 1171 (1986); Note, Fosfeitability of Attorney's Fees Traceable as Proceeds from a RICO Violation
under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1499 (1986). Finally, several
commentators have concluded that the statute reaches attorneys' fees and that it is not unconstitu-
tional to require the forfeiture of assets that would otherwise be transferred to attorneys. See
Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys'Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA.
L. REV. 493 (1985); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: A Trap for the Unwary, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 825
(1986); Comment, Today's RICO and Your Disappearing Legal Fee, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 59 (1985). See
generally, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relationship, 36 EMORY L.J. 755 (1987) (symposium
dedicated to the issue).
24 Four basic assumptions are integral to any principled effort to interpret a statute. R. DICKER-
SON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-12 (1975): (1) legislative supremacy
within the constitutional framework (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1); (2) use of the statute as a means to
exercise that supremacy; (3) reliance on accepted means of communication; and (4) reasonable avail-
ability of the statute to those it purports to govern, not only its text, but any other part of its legisla-
tive context that serves to give it meaning.
More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court noted, "It is easy, by very ingenious and astute
construction, to evade the force of almost any statute, where a court is so disposed... [By such] a
construction [a court] annuls . . . law and renders it superfluous and useless." Pillow v. Roberts, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 472, 476 (1851). But such an approach to statutory construction carries with it a
heavy price. After a lifetime of legal scholarship, Dean Roscoe Pound concluded that such construc-
tion (1) "tend[ed] to bring the law into disrespect; (2) ... subject[ed] the courts to political pressure;
[and] (3) ... invite[d] an arbitrary personal element in judicial administration." III JURISPRUDENCE
488 (1959). It threatened, he found, to make "laws... worth little" and to "break down" the "legal
order" itself. Id. at 490. See, e.g., Voters in 3 States Reect Chief Justices, Nat'l Law Journal, Nov. 17,
1986, p.3, col. 1.
25 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3.
26 See Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?, 36 EMORY L.J. 781, 783 (1987).
27 See supra note 26; infra note 30.
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The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was an attempt to fill the
statultory void by providing "new weapons of unprecedented scope for
an assault upon organized crime and 'its economic roots." 28 These new
laws revolutionized federal criminal law enforcement in at least three
ways.
First, the laws focused not simply on individuals, but also on organi-
zations. 29 Second, the laws authorized lengthier incarceration because of
a perception that the old philosophy of deterrence and rehabilitation,
like the old laws, did not work against organizational crime.30
Finally, Congress realized that a frontal assault on the power of or-
ganizational crime would not work if it only put the leaders away because
leaders are fungible - they can easily be replaced. The laws had to strike
at the motivation of the activity - at the profits. 3 ' Attempting to take the
profit out of crime, Congress revived the sanction of criminal forfeiture
inUnited States law. 32
Congress had hoped that through the use of the new provisions, for-
feiture would become a powerful weapon in the fight against drug traf-
ficking and racketeering. But the 1970 forfeiture provisions enjoyed
limited success. 33 The original provisions failed to stop defendants from
28 Russello v. United States, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
29 Conviction under RICO requires that the defendant have ehgaged in a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). CCE requires that a defendant have engaged in a "continut-
ing criminal enterprise ... in concert with five or more other persons." 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1982).
30 Organized Crime Control, 1970: Hearings on S. 30, and related proposals, Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 151 (1970) (statement of Attor-
ney General John Mitchell); supra note 3.
31 See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, supra note 4.
32 Prior to the Crime Control Act of 1970, criminal in personam forfeiture was almost nonexistent
in our history. Because of the severity of a punishment that denied heirs their inheritance, article iii,
section 3, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution prohibited forfeiture of estate for all convictions and
judgments. 1 Stat. 117, ch. 9, § 24 (1790) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)). The current forfei-
ture provisions avoid a conflict with the 1790 statute because they limit criminal forfeiture to prop-
erty connected to illegal activity or its value if-the property is unavailable.
Before 1970, forfeiture as a form of punishment had not been seen in the United States since
the Civil War. That war presented the dilemma of how to punish rebels in absentia for treason. The
existing treason statutes, requiring personal jurisdiction of the defendant, proved to be an inade-
quate route for confiscating Confederate-owned property in the North. With the Confiscation Acts,
Act ofJuly 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862), Congress approved narrowly, over President
Lincoln's objection, the use of in rem forfeitures for punitive purposes. After the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held the Act unconstitutional in Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385 (1863), the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, despite a vigorous dissent arguing that this
particular forfeiture actually punished offenders for treason, and therefore, could be used only pur-
suant to criminal proceedings. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 355-56 (1871). That Con-
gress's novel solution to a problem that the system's laws failed to address came to an end in 1886
when in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court held that an act authorizing
seizure of private papers to be used as evidence in the prosecution of an alleged crime was unconsti-
tutional. The Court explained that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfei-
ture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form,
are in their nature criminal," therefore entitling the defendant to the constitutional protections nor-
mally afforded a criminal defendant-including an in personam trial. RICO and CCE forfeiture occur
within the context of an in personam criminal proceeding.
For a more complete history of forfeiture law in the United States see Note, Bane of American
Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. RE V. 768 (1977); Note, Criminal Forfeiture of Attorney's
Fees Under RICO and CCE, 2 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1986).
33 In 1981, the General Accounting Office reported that the government's record in taking the
profit out of organized crime was far below Congress's expectations. The major reasons for the
disappointing forfeiture record were that federal law enforcement agencies did not pursue forfeiture
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defeating forfeiture by removing, transferring, or concealing their poten-
tially forfeitable assets prior to conviction. 34 Additionally, prosecutors
often failed to add forfeiture counts to their indictments.35 And when
prosecutors did seek forfeiture, some courts gave the provisions a narrow
construction 36-despite clear congressional intent otherwise. 37 General
congressional dissatisfaction with the application of criminal forfeiture
led to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.
The 1984 Act's amendments to federal criminal forfeiture law were
designed to "eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that
[had] frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement
agencies." 38 The amended sections provided for the same penalties that
had existed before, but they now provided that all traceable proceeds of
often and that the provisions were poorly drafted, containing limitations and ambiguities that im-
peded their use. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AssET FORFEITURE: A
SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING, 9-15 (1981), noted in S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 3, at 191 [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. See also ABA CRIMINALJUSTICE SECTION, supra note 8.
34 For example, before amendment the RICO forfeiture provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982),
provided:
[w]hoever violates any provision of this chapter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (I) any
interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Several circuits had held that forfeiture under the original act was mandatory. United States v.
Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983); United States v. L'Hoste,
609 F.2d 796, 809-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). But even if the statute mandated
forfeiture, forfeitable property was not clearly defined. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 194.
Futhermore, although the 1970 forfeiture provisions did authorize courts to issue orders restraining
the post-indictment transfer of assets, neither RICO nor CCE provided any standards for the issu-
ance of restraining orders. Id. at 195.
35 In rem forfeiture permits the goverment to seize property if it has probable cause to believe
the property was used to commit an alleged offense. E.g., United States v. One 56-foot Yacht Named
Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1983) (test is whether "information relied on by the govern-
ment is adequate and sufficiently reliable to warrant the belief by a reasonable person that the vessel
was used to transport controlled substances"); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93, reh 'g denied,
409 U.S. 902 (1972) (Pre-hearing seizure is constitutional in extraordinary situations when
(1) seizure necessary to secure important governmental or general public interest, (2) special need
for prompt action, and (3) goverment official initiates seizure after determining under the statute's
standards that seizure necessary and justified.). Because of the lower burden of proof and less intri-
cate procedure prior to the 1984 Act, law enforcement officials were using civil forfeiture measures
more often than the RICO or CCE criminal provisions. (For example, Congress has authorized civil
in rein forfeiture of controlled substances and the articles used to transport controlled substances, 21
U.S.C. § 881; obscene materials, 18 U.S.C. § 1465; money used in bribery schemes, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3612; articles not registered for customs, 19 U.S.C. § 1497; unlicensed firearms, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d); adulterated foods and drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 334.).
36 Several courts interpreted the 1970 Act to exclude the profits (proceeds) of the criminal en-
terprise from forfeiture, holding that the forfeiture provisions only attacked defendants' interests in
enterprises. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 765-70 (9th Cir. 1980)
(§ 1963(a)(1) forfeiture limited to interest in an enterprise); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d
276, 283-87 (7th Cir.) (same holding), vacated, 464 U.S. 979, aff'd as modified, 723 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1983), overruled by United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Meyers,
432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977). But see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (hold-
ing proceeds forfeitable).
37 Section 904(a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947 directs that "[the provisions of this title shall be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. See also 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(o). These are the only such instructions in substantive federal criminal law. Russello, 464 U.S.
at 27.
38 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 192.
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racketeering3 9 and drug4° activity were potentially subject to forfeiture
and made it easier for the government to obtain extensive forfeiture by
making it more difficult for defendants to avoid it.
Probably the most significant change affecting criminal defendants
and their attorneys was the amendment vesting title to forfeitable prop-
erty in the United States upon the commission of the illegal acts giving
rise to forfeiture. 41 This "relation-back" provision, 42 adapted from civil
39 18 USC § 1963(a) as amended provides:
(a) whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the
United States, irrespective of any provision of state law-
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962;
(2) any-
(a) interest in;
(b) security of;
(c) claim against; or
(d) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in
violation of section 1962.
40 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) now provides:
(a) Any person convicted of a violation.., shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of
any provision of State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part,
to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise
in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any prop-
erty described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and prop-
erty or contractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal
enterprise.
41 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 863(c). The identical language in the two statutes states:
(c) All rights title and interest in property... vests in the United States upon the commis-
sion of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subse-
quently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special
verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless
the transferee establishes.., that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who
at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was sub-
ject to forfeiture under this section.
The relation back taint theory has been the basis for the government's claim that fees paid to an
attorney may be forfeited upon conviction of the client.
42 The relation back concept has long standing application in civil forfeiture proceedings. The
Supreme Court permitted forfeiture upon the commission of an offense in 1814 in United States v.
1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 389, 404-05 (1814). Apparently by 1890 the relation back
concept was well established. In United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890), the Court said:
By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that upon the commission of
a certain act specific property used in or connected with that act shall be forfeited, the
forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property
then vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected until judicial condemna-
tion; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the
time the offence is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that
time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith.
Today courts continue to accept the legitimacy of a relation back civil forfeiture provision vesting
title in the govenment at the time of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. "Monkey," 725 F.2d 1007,
1012 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984); Simons v. United States, 541 F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976). Courts
have recently upheld application of relation back vesting in criminal forfeiture cases as well. See, e.g.,
Ramaria Familienstiftung v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 139, 145 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v.
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in rem forfeiture law, voids all transfers made subsequent to the crime43
and allows the government to take possession of property transferred to
parties who themselves had no involvement in criminal activity. 44 Rela-
tion-back helps to sterilize forfeitable property in the hands of present or
future defendants because third parties may not be willing to accept
property that they may not be able to keep. Dealing in drugs and other
organized criminal activities may be highly profitable, but the economic
profit will provide considerably less power if the forfeiture provisions can
sterilize the profits.
Although similar to civil in rem forfeiture in the use of relation back,
the criminal in personam forfeiture of RICO and CCE does not rely upon
the legal fiction that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing.45 Rather,
in personam forfeiture results from a finding of personal guilt. 46 The crim-
inal conviction can only establish that the government's property interest
is superior to the convict's. It cannot divest the property rights of inno-
cent non-party transferees. 47 Thus, the RICO and CCE statutes provide
that if a third party transferee establishes in a post-trial48 hearing that
"he is a bona fide purchaser for value.., who at the time of the purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture," 49 he or she may keep tainted property.
The nature of legal representation means that attorneys, more than
most others selling goods or services to defendants, will be in a position
to know of the tainted origin of assets. Both sides of the fee forfeiture
debate have therefore concluded that attorneys can seldom qualify for
the bona fide purchaser protection that the statute provides. 50
A second significant impact on defendants and the criminal defense
bar arises as a result of the 1984 Act's attempts to ease the government's
burden for obtaining restraining orders used by the government to pre-
vent defendants from dissipating assets in which the government alleges
Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); U.S. v. Nichols, 841
F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988)..
43 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971); United
States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890). Though courts have read relation back into in rem forfei-
ture actions, some civil forfeiture statutes also explicitly provide for it. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (h).
44 Such an application of forfeiture leads to harsh results at times. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685-90 (1974), and cases cited therein.
45 Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized Narcotics Trafficking,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 227, 232-33 (1982); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 768, 784 (1977).
46 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 13-14 (1827).
47 Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 285 (1980)
states:
This "relation back" principle is inapplicable to RICO in personam forfeitures because
the doctrine is grounded in the essential nature of in rem forfeiture actions. In those ac-
tions, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant because the thing to be forfeited is consid-
ered the offender. Thus, the "relation back" doctrine cannot be employed in an in personam
action in which forfeiture is dependent on the guilt of the former owner. Accordingly, be-
cause RICO established an in personam forfeiture procedure, the innocence of the present
owner must control if the defendant does not retain an interest in the property.
(citations omitted); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 208.
48 Both statutes bar third party intervention before conclusion of the criminal proceedings. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(k).
49 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B).
50 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 9-111.511.
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an interest. 51 Before the 1984 amendments, court decisions adopted
civil procedures for the granting of restraining orders.5 2 These decisions
allowed defendants to challenge pretrial the validity of any indictment to
which the government attached a forfeiture count before the government
was prepared to try the case.5 3 In effect this required the government to
prove the merits of the underlying criminal case and forfeiture counts
well in advance of trial in order to obtain an order restraining defend-
ants' property alleged to be forfeitable in the indictment. The govern-
ment seldom sought forfeiture.5 4
The 1984 amendments significantly change the procedurefor ob-
taining restraining orders. They permit the government to rely on the
probable cause established in indictments to obtain 'restraining orders.55
If the government seeks to restrain assets before obtaining an indict-
ment, however, defendants have the right to hearings, 56 but in these
hearings the government may rely on hearsay.5 7 , Witnesses need not be
produced before trial.
Two important questions arose almost immediately after enactment
of the forfeiture amendments: (1) Did Congress intend to subject attor-
neys' fees to possible forfeiture; and (2) Does the Constitution permit the
government to use relation-back and restraining orders to prevent de-
fendants from transferring assets to attorneys as fees? The language of
the statutes answers the first question; answering the constitutional issue
is more difficult. The timing of the forfeiture order causes the alleged
constitutional problem. Because RICO and CCE forfeitures are in per-
sonam, the question of defendants' property interests in allegedly forfeita-
ble assets is intimately connected with the question of their guilt. A
finding that property is in fact subject to forfeiture occurs only at the
conclusion of criminal trials resulting in convictions. 58 Yet the govern-
51 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 202.
52 See infra note 116.
53 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 196.
54 Id at 191; see generally GAO REPORT, supra note 33.
55 The issuance of the indictment or information establishes probable cause. See S. REP. No.
225, supra note 3, at 202-03 ("Since a warrant for the arrest of the defendant may issue upon the
filing of an indictment or information, and so the indictment or information is sufficient to support a
restraint of the defendant's liberty, it is clear that the same basis is sufficient to support a restraint on
the defendant's -ability to transfer or rem ove property alleged to be subject, to criminal forfeiture in
the indictment.") Because an indictment or information alleging a RICO or CCE violation estab-
lishes probable cause, the government is not required to produce additional evidence regarding the
merits of the prosecution when seeking a post-indictment restraining order. See S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 3, at 202. But see cases cited infra note 116.
56 The 1984 Act authorizes courts to issue pre-indictment restraining orders if the government
establishes at an adversary hearing a substantial probability of prevailing at trial on the forfeiture
issue. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(B)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i). In the limited category of cases in
which the government may obtain an e parte restraining order prior to indictment, the government
must establish probable cause to believe that the property in question would be subject to forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2).
Property need not even be restrained for forfeiture to impact on defendants' ability to retain
attorneys. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50.
57 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(3).
58 See supra note 6.
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ment, on a showing of probable cause, may prevent defendants from dis-
posing of restrained property although they have not been convicted. 59
Needless to say, for the judiciary fee forfeiture has raised challeng-
ing questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation. Before con-
fronting constitutional questions, it makes sense to determine whether
the statute was even intended to apply to attorneys' fees.60
II. The Statute
No general rule exists confining the scope of legislation to the par-
ticular intent or state of mind of the enacting legislature.6' Nor need the
legislative history delineate a statute's every meaning. 62 Rather, the
words of a statute, read in light of its general purpose, are usually held to
control, at least in the absence of clear evidence in the legislative history
to the contrary.63
With the preceding principles in mind it is clear that the broadly
drafted provisions of the 1984 Act include attorneys' fees in the category
of potentially forfeitable assets. The plain, categorical language of the
statute contains no exception for attorneys' fees: "Any person convicted
of a violation ... shall forfeit to the United States . . . (1) any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly
or indirectly, as a result of such violation.. . . "64 The clear terms of the
statute subject defendants' tainted assets to forfeiture without regard to
whether they intend to use them to retain attorneys. The statute only
exempts tainted assets from forfeiture if third parties have claims vesting
prior to the government's or are bona fide purchasers - without regard
to whether they are attorneys. Where a statute's language is unambigu-
ous, a court's task of statutory construction ends unless enforcement of
the literal language would contravene a clearly expressed legislative
intention. 65
Some courts, 66 however, have mistakenly attempted to limit the for-
feiture provisions specifically to one of the purposes expressed in the
legislative history: the need to prevent defendants from avoiding forfei-
59 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 202. But see, United States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of
Shop in the Grove Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988).
60 "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language." Rusello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 20 (1973) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (interpreting
RICO)).
61 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (The "Court frequently has
observed that a statute is not to be confined to the particular application[s] ... contemplated by the
legislators.").
62 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981) ("Congress cannot be expected to specifi-
cally address each issue of statutory construction which may arise."); Standefer v. United States, 447
U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980) (need not mention in committee report).
63 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordina-
rily be regarded as conclusive.").
64 See supra notes 39, 40.
65 See supra note 63.
66 See United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. W. Va. 1987); United States v. Ian-
niello, 644 F. Supp. 452,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 917-18
(4th Cir. 1987).
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ture through sham transactions.67 From these few passages these courts
have concluded that forfeiture applies to attorneys' fees only if the funds
were given to the attorneys - not in return for services - but in order to
harbor them from forfeiture. 68 The bona fide purchaser limitation of the
forfeiture provisions and language in the legislative history do indicate a
concern with preventing sham or fraudulent transfers and provide a rem-
edy. But congressional disapproval of a specific type of conduct cannot
legitimately be used to restrict unambiguously broader statutory lan-
guage to the one specifically mentioned purpose. 69 That the statute does
not mention attorneys' fees does not mean that the language is ambigu-
ous; rather, it suggests that Congress did not mean to treat assets
earmarked for attorneys differently than other assets.
In fact, to limit the statute to fraudulent transfers would seriously
violate the purposes of the 1984 Act's forfeiture provisions. One impor-
tant purpose of forfeiture is to take the incentive out of crime, by taking
away the profitability.70 Additionally, the government has a strong deter-
67 Courts have cited several statements in the Senate report as evidence that Congress intended
to limit the forfeiture provisions to sham transactions. First, the Senate report contains a footnote
that reads: "The provision [18 U.S.C. 1963(m)] should be construed to deny relief to third parties
acting as nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transac-
tions. The standard for relief reflects the principles concerning voiding of transfers set out in 18
U.S.C. 1963(c), as amended by the bill." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 209 nA7. Second, the
Senate report's discussion of the third party transfer provisions says, "The purpose of this provision
is to permit the voiding of certain preconviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in cur-
rent law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not arms'
length transactions." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 200-01. Courts limiting the operation of the
third party forfeiture provisions to sham or fraudulent transactions have cited the first passage -
footnote 47 in the Senate report. See e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1471 (5th Cir.
1986); Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 4 5 5 -5 6 United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo.
1985). Also, courts rely on the passage of the Senate report evincing a purpose of voiding transfers
that were not at "arms length" to support the view that only sham transactions concerned Congress.
United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 456-57 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
Thus, because lawyers representing criminal defendants are not usually engaged in sham transac-
tions, some courts have held that assets paid to them cannot be forfeited.
68 These courts have relied on Court language stating that if there are "two possible interpreta-
tions of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty
is to adopt that which will save the act." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937). There must, however, be at least two plausible readings of the statute for this principle to
apply. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 917-18.
69 Only if the language of the act is ambiguous should courts examine the legislative history
surrounding its enactment. They may not use the legislative history to create an ambiguity, however,
for the words of the statute are usually the best indication of congressional intent. "Most formal
statements of purpose in bills or committee reports tend to be innocuous generalities designed to
offend the least number of people, a fact that destroys most of their usefulness for resolving specific
uncertainties in meaning." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 91
(1975). Furthermore, "Striking down a law approved by the democratically elected representatives
of the people is no minor matter." Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2600 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Limiting forfeiture to third parties engaged in sham transactions ignores the contrary words of
§ 853(c) requiring the forfeiture of assets held by third parties unless the transferee was "reasonably
without cause" at the time of the purchase to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. A
third party can obtain assets through a non-sham transaction but with the knowledge that the assets
are subject to forfeiture. The statute as written by Congress establishes that third party transfers are
subject to forfeiture on the basis of the purchaser's knowledge of the possibility of forfeiture, not on
the basis of whether the transaction was fraudulent.
70 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 205-12 (3d ed. 1986) (proposing that remov-
ing part of the profit incentive through fines may deter better than jail sentences).
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rent interest that fee forfeiture and restraining orders serve. 71 While it is
true that no one engages in crime solely to be able to retain the finest
legal talent, drug kingpins' and racketeers' certain knowledge that they
can afford almost any lawyer's fee may make them less apprehensive
about continuing criminal activity. Another congressional purpose is to
strip these criminals of their undeserved power, part of which is the abil-
ity to command high-priced legal talent with money that they probably
did not legally acquire.72 Part of the power these organizations com-
mand derives from the ability to purchase corrupt lawyers willing to per-
vert the law.73
III. The Constitution
Much of the current commentary considers the constitutional ques-
tions to be the most important aspect of the forfeiture problem. Com-
mentators and defendants have asserted that both the sixth amendment
and the fifth amendment are violated if courts apply the 1984 Act to at-
torneys' fees. 74 The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this
question. The only way, then, to consider whether the Constitution is
violated by attorney fee forfeiture is to apply analysis developed up to
this point in other contexts.
A. Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "in all crimi-
nal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence." 75 The right to counsel embodies three
distinct but related rights. These are the absolute right to representation
by counsel in criminal proceedings, 76 the qualified right of nonindigent
defendants to counsel of their choice, 77 and the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel. 78
Much of the sixth amendment concern with criminal forfeiture arises
from the belief that defendants will not be able to select attorneys, or
even obtain attorneys, if the government can restrain enough of their
assets. Sixth amendment interference may occur even without a re-
straining order because the threat of forfeiture may dissuade qualified
attorneys from accepting cases at the outset. 79
71 In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 644 (4th Cir.
1988).
72 U.S. v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1987).
73 See Staff Report on Mob Lawyers: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 37 CRIM. L. RPTR.
201820 (1985) (corrupt "mob" attorneys constitute significant threat to the Bar's integrity dispro-
portionate to their numbers).
74 See supra note 23.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76 See infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
77 See infra text accompanying notes 87-107.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 108-16.
79 See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to
Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 510-15 (1985); Cloud, supra note 18, at 6-7.
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1. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 Does Not Implicate the
Absolute Right to Representation.
The absolute right of criminal defendants to be represented by
counsel, first recognized in Powell v. Alabama,80 guarantees counsel in any
proceeding involving possible imprisonment. 81 The government must
provide indigent defendants with appointed counsel and nonindigent de-
fendants with a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel.8 2 This abso-
lute right may not be denied on the basis of any countervailing
government interest.
Because constitutional jurisprudence requires that indigent criminal
defendants receive government financial representation, Congress has
granted courts statutory authority to appoint counsel based on a showing
of financial inability.8 3 This requirement would not exclude defendants
unable to retain attorneys willing to accept money subject to possible
forfeiture from qualifying for appointed representation.8 4
What the Constitution does not grant, however, is an absolute or
unconditional right to counsel of choice. In a novel factual setting Powell
established a due process right to effective appointed counsel, yet courts
consistently cite it for the proposition that the right to counsel of choice
is a fundamental sixth amendment guarantee.8 5 But the right to choose
the representative has never been as inviolate as the right to be repre-
sented. Rather, the courts have repeatedly permitted government inter-
80 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
81 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
82 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
83 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986) (counsel appointed when defend-
ant "financially unable to obtain counsel"). The CriminalJustice Act imposes maximum rates for the
compensation of appointed attorneys. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (hourly rate); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(d)(2) (compensation in one case). However, the chiefjudge of each circuit is authorized to
waive the limit on total compensation in complex cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3).
84 Undoubtedly some defendants will not have access to any untainted assets that they could use
to retain attorneys. In such cases the courts must appoint attorneys. But some district courts have
reasoned that defendants whose assets have been fiozen are not elegible for appointed counsel.
United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452,457 (S.D.N.Y 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614
F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y 1985). These courts have misconstrued the scope of the statutory availa-
bility of appointed counsel.
"Indigency" is not a requirement for qualification of appointed counsel, and the fact that de-
fendants may have "access" to funds is not determinative. Rather, defendants need only be "finan-
cially unable to obtain counsel." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b). See United States v. De Hernandez, 745 F.2d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 933 (1973). Financial inability is a lesser standard than indigency. United States v. Harris, 707
F.2d 653, 660 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997 (1983). A broad range of considerations is relevant
to whether defendants are financially unable to obtain counsel. United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d
894, 897 (10th Cir. 1987). For example, the courts may consider whether they have assets available
for their use. Id. But because the court has not determined in whom title to property subject to
possible forfeiture lies, those assets do not contribute to the financial ability of defendants to obtain
representation. See United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp: 1541, 1552 n.15 (D. Utah 1987).
85 See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, 644 F..Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y 1985); United States v. Badala-
menti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col. 1985);
Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Powell did state that "It is hardly necessary to say that, the
right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel
of his own choice." 287 U.S. at 53. However, Powell's facts are unique. See Brickey, supra note 79, at
506.
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ference with defendants' choices when the interests at stake tipped the
scale in the state's favor.8 6
2. Restraining Orders And The Threat of Fee Forfeiture Implicate,
But Do Not Violate, the Qualified Right of Nonindigent
Defendants to Counsel of Choice.
Although until recently the Supreme Court has faithfully attempted
to avoid addressing a right to counsel of choice,87 lower federal courts
have indicated that a qualified right to counsel of choice is an implicit
sixth amendment guarantee. 88 Yet in numerous factual situations the ju-
diciary has qualified the right to counsel of choice, permitting the gov-
ernment to act in ways that adversely affect criminal defendants before
trial when necessary to protect important public interests. 89
For example, defendants may not insist on representation by attor-
neys who are not members of the bar9° or by attorneys who cannot ethi-
86 See infra text accompanying notes 88-107.
87 Until recently the Supreme Court had never decided a case clearly on the basis of the right to
choose counsel. Opinions discussing the importance of defendants' ability to select their attorneys
were invariably decided on grounds other than a constitutional right to counsel of choice. See Powell,
287 U.S. at 71 (due process violated when court effectively denied indigent defendants in a capital
case were effectively denied counsel); Glasser v. United States, 215 U.S. 60 (1942) (sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel violated where court appointed an attorney with a conflict of
interest); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (due process violated by failure to provide reason-
able opportunity to obtain counsel); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (voluntary confes-
sion in the absence of an attorney does not violate due process), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendants have constitutional right to
conduct their own defenses); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (pretrial disqualification
of defense counsel not immediately appealable). Justice Brennan's concurrence in Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 19-26 (1983), contained one of the most extensive discussions of the right to choose
counsel.
Recently, however, the Court decided Wheat v. United States, -U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 56
U.S.L.W. 4441, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2306 (May 23, 1988). In Wheat the Court held that while a trial
court must recognize the sixth amendment's presumption in favor of defendants' counsel of choice,
the government may overcome that presumption not only by a demonstrating actual conflict of inter-
est, but also by showing the serious potential for a conflict.
88 See e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
89 A court may restrict a defendant's choice when allowing the defendant to be represented by a
particular attorney would adversely affect an important public interest. United States v. Phillips, 699
F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983). A court may not, however, "arbitrarily refuse to allow the defend-
ant to retain the lawyer of his choice." Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 832 (1983);see also United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir. 1986) (choice may not be
"hindered unnecessarily"); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 592 (11 th Cir.) (en banc) (improper if
"unreasonably denies" choice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Linton, 656 F.2d at 209 (may not
"arbitrarily and unreasonabley interfere" with choice).
90 While accused do have the right to conduct their own defenses even if they are not licensed
attorneys, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 826, 835-36 (1975), that right does not allow them to select
some other person who is not a licensed attorney to represent them at trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Tedder, 787 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Afflerbach, 547 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977). Nor
may defendants insist on being represented by attorneys who have been disbarred. United States v.
Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976). Also, a court may properly deny defendants their choice
of counsel if their attorney of choice is licensed to practice only in a different state. Williams v. Nix,
751 F.2d 956, 959-60 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1138 (1985); Ford, 701 F.2d at 692-93. But see
United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 815-18 (1st Cir. 1987) (local rule limiting out-of-
state attorneys to one pro hac vice appearance annually fails to advance interest in regulating conduct
of attorneys).
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cally represent them in particular cases. 91 And a court's refusal to
reschedule trials or to grant the continuances necessary to allow the cho-
sen attorneys to participate in particular cases is permissible even though
it may deny defendants their counsel of choice. 92 The issue these deci-
sions generally confronted was whether the trial court actions "arbitrarily
and unreasonably interfere[d] with a client's right to be represented by
the attorney he has selected."93 Resolving the issue merely required bal-
ancing the interest of the government and society in the efficient admin-
istration of justice against the defendant's qualified right to retain
counsel of choice.94 No sixth amendment violation exists in any of these
situations, yet one is claimed where fee forfeiture produces the same re-
sult. But in none of these cases did the courts question the financial abil-
ity of the defendants to retain counsel. The forfeitability of attorneys'
fees raises a slightly different problem for the financial ability of the ac-
cused is the issue in an analysis of the forfeitability of fees.
91 If there are conflicts of interest between the attorneys chosen by defendants and people in-
volved in the trial, the attorneys usually may be excluded unless the likelihood and severity of the
conflict are minimal compared to the defendants' interest in obtaining their counsel of choice. See
United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1987) (attorney disqualified because he
had previously represented a codefendant); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir.
1987) (request for substitution denied because of attorney's representation of codefendants), aff'd,
-U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 56 U.S.L.W. 4441 (1988); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1983) (attorney disqualified because of his prior representation of a witness); United States v. Phil-
lips, 699 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1983) (attorney disqualified because he had represented the person
defendant named as his supplier in a drug prosecution); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1981) (attorney disqualified because he had represented the company whose assets defendant was
being tried for converting); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1004-05 (3d Cir.) (attorney
disqualified because of his prior representation of government's chief witness), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
899 (1980); United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.) (attorney disqualified because law firm
associate had previously worked with the prosecution in the case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
But see United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1464-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (error to disqualify
attorney who had previously worked with Justice Department Strike Force simply because of an ap-
pearance of impropriety); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982), appeal after
remand, 723 F.2d 217 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984) (error to disqualify one attorney be-
cause he had previously represented a witness, but partial disqualification of a second attorney for
similar reasons permissible). Defendants' counsel of choice has also been denied when their pre-
ferred attorney has been implicated in the crime, United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1007-08
(11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), or when the attorney was scheduled to be called as a
witness, In re GrandJury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986). The government's interests in avoiding unethical practices and in
maintaining the integrity and the appearance of integrity of the judiciary have justified the denial of
selected counsel in these cases.
92 This issue has arisen when defendants had not obtained attorneys by the time of trial, United
States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290,
1293-94 (8th Cir. 1979); when a chosen attorneys claimed that they had inadequate time to prepare
for trial, Birt, 725 F.2d.at 591-92; United States v. LaMonte, 684 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1982); Linton,
656 F.2d at 208; when chosen attorneys were unavailable because of illness, Giacelone v. Lucas, 445
F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972); or a scheduling conflict, Sam-
pley v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 786 F.2d 610, 611-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
3305 (1986); Rankin, 779 F.2d at 956-58; when counsel withdrew, United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d
952, 954-56 (10th Cir, 1987); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); or when defendants sought to obtain new attorneys immediately before
trial, Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316 (1984).
93 Linton, 656 F.2d at 209. The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutionally pro-
tected right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
94 See, e.g., Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1322 n.2 (listing five factors); Burton, 584 F.2d at 490-91 (listing
eight factors).
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Although unfortunate, the harsh reality of our system of justice is
that "the quality of a defendant's representation frequently may turn on
his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy." 95 Defendants' right
to counsel of choice is so obviously limited by their financial ability to
retain desired attorneys that most courts mention it if at all, only in pass-
ing.96 Criminal forfeiture requires that courts now perform a more sub-
stantial analysis of this issue. This analysis is not, however, without some
guidance.
The flexibility that the Supreme Court has afforded the government
in other areas of pretrial interference with criminal defendants indicates
that the goverment may properly contest defendants' use of allegedly
tainted assets to retain their chosen attorneys. For example, in United
States v. Salerno,97 the Supreme Court allowed the government to detain
defendants pretrial in certain instances because pretrial detention is a
regulatory measure necessary to protect the public's interest in commu-
nity safety and in preventing crime.98 Because society's interests would
be threatened if no action could be taken prior to trial, the Court allowed
the imprisonment of a limited class of defendants prior to trial - even
though this may greatly impact on the trial outcome because detained
defendants can do little to aid their defenses.
The requirement that defendants post bail99 also allows the govern-
ment to affect the rights of criminal defendants before trial. Any assets
that defendants must use to post bail are no longer available to retain
95 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 Burton stated: "An accused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of
the opportunity to do so." 584 F.2d at 489; United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974) (expressed right to counsel of choice as the "right of any accused, if
he can provide counsel for himself by his own resources or through the aid of his family or friends,
to be represented by the attorney of his choosing."); U.S. v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987)
(right to counsel of choice out of one's private resources, free of government interference); see also
Wheat, 813 F.2d at 1401; Wilson, 761 F.2d at 280; Urquhart, 726 F.2d at 1319. In affirming Wheat the
Supreme Court said:
The Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is circumscribed in several
important respects. Regardless of his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member
of the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in court. Similarly, a defendant may
not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to
represent the defendant.
108 S. Ct. at 1697 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Defendants are not denied the right to choice of counsel if they are unable to afford the best
attorneys and must settle for some other attorneys. Nor are indigent defendants denied the right to
choice of counsel because they are unable privately to retain any attorney at all. Indigent defendants
must be provided with appointed counsel at state expense. But indigent defendants do not have a
right to choose appointed counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92-93 (1st cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 164 (1986); United States v. Mitchell, 788 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1986); Wil-
liams, 751 F.2d at 959-60; see also Morris, 461 U.S. at 23 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, a court
may refuse to appoint the defendant's counsel of choice even if that attorney is willing to represent
the defendant. United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 904-05 (7th cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1037
(1984). Similarly, indigent defendants do not have a right to attorneys who share their beliefs about
the validity of the laws under which they are being prosecuted. See United States v. Grosshans, 821
F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 506 (1987); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231,
1242-43 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163,
166-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). See generally, Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
97 107 S. Ct. 2096 (1987).
98 Id. at 2102-03.
99 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xii).
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attorneys. Nevertheless, federal courts may require defendants to "exe-
cute bail bond[s] with solvent sureties in such amount as is reasonably
necessary to assure [their] appearance"1 00 in court. Bail serves the obvi-
ous public interest of securing defendants' presence in court.101
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") also have the ability to interfere financially
with defendants investigated for possible tax or securities law violations.
For example, two Internal Revenue Code procedures, "jeopardy assess-
ment" 10 2 and "termination of the taxable year,"' 1 3 authorize the IRS to
seize taxpayer assets before they have an opportunity to challenge the
validity of the seizures in court. 10 4 And'courts have granted the SEC
freeze orders to prevent defendants from dissipating, concealing or dis-
posing of assests until profits derived from illegal activity have been
disgorged. 10 5
No different from the preceding examples, an order securing an in
personam judgment by restraining defendants from transferring poten-
tially forfeitable property is also a regulatory measure necessary to pro-
tect an important public interest. As Justice Brennan has said, a restraint
of property that is subject to forfeiture is an appropriate means of "fos-
tering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the prop-
100 Id.
101 Likewise, "[tihe sole purpose of the bill's restraining order provision ... is to preserve the
status quo, i.e., to assure the availability of the property pending disposition of the criminal case." S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 204.
102 I.R.C. § 6861 (1982). This procedure permits the IRS, when it believes that assessment or
collection of a tax currently due and payable would be "jeopardized by delay," to assess the tax
immediately. Id at (a). The act of assessment creates a lien on the taxpayer's property and allows
the IRS summarily to levy upon it and sell it. I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331 (1982). Through these proce-
dures the IRS may deprive taxpayers of the use of property with which they might have retained
lawyers in order to contest the validity of the assessments. See Human Eng'g Inst. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 61 (1973) (lien on property remained valid through six years of pretrial negotiation despite
challenge on right to counsel grounds);-I.R.C. § 6322 (1982) (The lien remains "until the liability for
the amount so assessed ... is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.").
103 I.R.C. § 6851 (1982). This procedure enables the IRS to demand immediate payment of
taxes for the current or preceding taxable year if it finds that taxpayers are about to leave the United
States, conceal themselves or their assets, or "do any other act.., tending to prejudice" the collec-
tion of the tax. Id. at (a)(1). As is true under thejeopardy assessment procedure, property is subject
to an immediate levy that may freeze it through protracted litigation.
104 Levies on property have preceded and followed indictment and arrest and reached assets
assigned to criminal defense attorneys in return for their services. See, e.g., United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 138 F. Supp. 555, 556 (S.D.N.Y, 1956) (government filed tax liens on corporate
assets two months before indictment for tax fraud); O'Connor v. United States, 203 F.2d 301, 302-
03 (4th Cir. 1953) (government filed tax liens on defendant's assets almost two years post-indict-
ment); United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923
(1976) (jeopardy assessment instituted post-arrest; no sixth amendment violation); Freistak v. Egger,
551 F. Supp. 238, 240 (M.D. Pa. 1982) .(same). For an expanded discussion of assets subject to tax
liens and additional case authority see Brickey, supra note 79, at 525-29. For a discussion of the effect
of summary assessment procedures on criminal defendants see generally Tarlow, Criminal Defendants
and Abuse ofJeopardy Assessment Tax Procedures, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1191 (1975).
105 SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06,(2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Paro, 468
F. Supp. 635, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,352, at 93,207-08 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. General Refractories Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1260
(D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 870, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Manor
Nursing noted that district judges should be wary of freezing defendants' assets, not because it would
be a hardship to the defendants, but rather because the freeze may destroy their businesses and
thereby leave them unable to pay their victims, 458 F.2d at 1105-06.
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erty and in enforcing criminal sanctions." 10 6 Similarly, the refusal of
otherwise interested attorneys to accept a case because of threatened for-
feiture absolutely violates the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice
only if such a qualified sixth amendment right is greater than the govern-
ment's interests in preserving assets subject to forfeiture and taking the
profit out of criminal activity.10 7
3. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel is not Violated by the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.
Because the absolute right to be represented by counsel is now
firmly established in our jurisprudence, most recent sixth amendment
cases in the courts have addressed the quality of representation received
by criminal defendants.' 08 After all, at least in theory defendants repre-
sented by attorneys can no longer claim that their trials are fundamen-
tally unfair - the right to representation is meant to avoid that. Rather,
they are limited to attacking the quality of their representation.
Much of the fee forfeiture debate has focused on the quality of rep-
resentation available to defendants rendered indigent under the forfei-
ture provisions. 0 9 Again, the Supreme Court's guidance in this area is
illuminating.
After years of refusing certiorari in a quality of representation case,
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington1 0 held that claims of actual
ineffective assistance of counsel should be resolved by a two-part test." ' I
First, defendants must establish that their attorney's particular conduct
was deficient as measured by the objective standard of reasonableness
106 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677 (1974).
107 United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that the government's inter-
est is superior); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988) (same); United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1987).
108 Genego, The Future of Elective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representa-
tion, 22 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1984).
109 The argument is not unusual. Even before the right to representation was extended to crimi-
nal defendants, courts and commentators were concerned about the quality of representation re-
ceived by the poor. Expanding the right to counsel to indigents would require a substantial influx of
attorneys to handle criminal cases. See, e.g., Lombard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice,
4705 Am. JUD. SOC'Y 176, 178 (1964); W. BEANGY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS
(1955). Commentators did seriously consider the availability and quality of attorneys in the after-
math of Gideon's expansion of the right. See, e.g., Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 NW.U. L. REv. 289 (1965) (concluding that only
reasonable staffing and reasonable compensation can begin to remedy ineffective assistance
problems); Grand, Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1247 (1970) (system must overcome shortage of
appointed attorneys to maintain equal justice); Calkins, CriminalJusticefor the Indigent, 42 U. DET. L.J.
305, 322-27 (1965) (Gideon creates quality of representation problems because inadequate funding,
bias towards prosecutors, and disincentives to practicing criminal law persist); Craig, The Right to
Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 SW. L. J. 260, 280 (1968) (Gideon
challenges operation of adversary system; legal education must meet increased demand for quality
defense counsel).
Similar concerns over the integrity of the public defender system are being voiced by critics of
criminal forfeiture. See supra note 23. But as Nichols stated: "It is hard to conceive of a legal system
in which appointed counsel is routinely adequate in a death penalty case, but is somehow inadequate
in a case involving the career criminal millionaire who purchases cars, businesses, and real estate
with cash delivered to banks in suitcases.' " 841 F.2d at 1507.
110 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
111 Id. at 687.
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under "prevailing professional norms."' 1 2 Second, defendants must es-
tablish a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' 1 3
Strickland has important implications for the legal fee forfeiture de-
bate. Strickland looks retrospectively at the actual representation given at
trial before declaring it constitutionally inadequate. The commentators
urging that the 1984 Act is unconstitutional have not shown that any par-
ticular representation is inadequate. Rather, they argue for a dangerous
constitutional precedent that the representation necessarily will be be-
cause RICO and CCE cases are complex. Apparently they believe that
only the free market can do an adequate job,"14 that courts should rule
public defenders, as a matter of constitutional law, always inadequate to
defend complex cases.' 15 The Supreme Court has never been willing to
do this.
In fact, Strickland already provides for the protection that the bar has
been requesting - although the bar insists on a constitutional exemp-
112 Id. at 687-88, 690. The Court's opinion repeatedly stresses that, when reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, courts must apply a "presumption" of competency. Id. at 689, 690.
113 Id. at 694. The Court stated that a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome. Id. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court had
held that where there is constitutional error the state bears the burden of proving that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24. Strickland changed the burden on an ineffec-
tiveness claim because the Court believed that in those cases defendants are in a superior position to
assume the burden of proving prejudice. But see Genego, supra note 108, at 200-01 (arguing that
defendants are in no better position).
114 Such a prophesy may be self-fulfilling. If public defenders are seldom permitted to handle
complex cases, representation in the few they are required to handle probably will be less than
spectacular.
115 Numerous objections have been raised to reliance upon appointed counsel and public defend-
ers in criminal forfeiture cases. First, it is said that public defenders have neither the resources nor
the expertise necessary to represent defendants charged with CCE or RICO violations. See United
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Comment, RICO and the Forfeiture
of Attorneys' Fees: Removing the Adversay from the Adversarial System?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 201, 224-25
(1987). Cases involving criminal forfeiture are also especially complex, lengthy, and expensive. See
United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); G. Lefcourt & E. Horwitz, The RICO
Era: Megatrials, Mega Problems, Megabucks, N.Y.L.J. P. 1 col. 2 (Jan. 21, 1988). Furthermore, public
defenders are often overworked, Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349, and the compensation provided ap-
pointed counsel under the CriminalJustice Act has been viewed as inadquate to persuade attorneys
to take these kinds of cases, see Estevez, 645 F. Supp. at 871. Finally, appointed counsel is not avail-
able until an indictment has been handed down. As the Criminal Justice Act is administered, as-
signed counsel typically is appointed by the court upon arraignment on the complaint or upon
indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (listing the cirumstances under which counsel may be ap-
pointed).
See generally, N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR (1982). After surveying
public defender systems around the country, Professor Lefstein concluded:
The decision to furnish counsel to the accused in criminal and juvenile cases is a matter
of federal constitutional right, not simply of grace. Yet, as documented in this report,
meaningful compliance with the Constitution is often absent due to inadequate funding.
Indeed, public defender and assigned counsel programs experience virtually every imagina-
ble kind of financial deficiency. There are neither enough lawyers to represent the poor,
nor are all the available attorneys trained, supervised, assisted by ample support staffs, or
sufficiently compensated.
Id. at 56 (citation omitted). See also Note, The Criminal Forfeiture Provisions of the RICO and CCE Statutes:
Their Application to Attorneys'Fees, 19 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 1199, 1211 (1986); but see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 1 (1986) ("[Ihe adversarial nature of the
legal system requires a strong and independent defense bar without regard to the defendant's ability
to pay for legal services. These services.., are being provided ... in every jurisdiction in the United
States." (emphasis added)).
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tion. As Strickland states, the standard for evaluating particular represen-
tation in these highly complex cases remains the objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Since the legal
profession sets its own required standards, why does it worry? If the pro-
fession sets attainable standards for representation in these complex
cases that public defenders were always to fall below, defendants would
always win their Strickland appeals. It would be in the governments inter-
est, then, either to release assets so that defendants could retain private
attorneys or to raise the rates paid public defenders in these complex
cases 1 6 in order to attract competent counsel. Otherwise, no conviction
would stick. Recognizing that the Constitution grants to all the right to
competent representation is quite different than arguments that constitu-
tionally everyone deserves the finest lawyer.
B. Due Process
According to the 1984 Act, if a court grants to the government a
preindictment order restraining any person's assets, the person affected
must be granted a hearing within ten days. 117 If an indictment has been
filed, however, the 1984 Act permits courts to grant .orders restraining
defendants from disposing of assets alleged to be forfeitable in the in-
dictment without mandating the same due process hearing.'",
The defense bar has argued that by applying the forfeiture statute to
restrain payment of attorneys' fees, the government deprives defendants
of the use of property which must be presumed to be theirs because they
are presumed innocent until proven guilty." 9 At least in the postindict-
ment situation, where no adversary hearing is statutorily granted, by de-
priving defendants of the use of "their" property without an adversarial
hearing, they argue, the government effectively takes property without
due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment. 20 This argument
is flawed for two reasons.
First, the presumption of innocence is not violated - it does not
even apply to this situation. The presumption of innocence has never
meant that defendants are innocent or must be treated as if they are until
conviction. Rather:
116 See supra note 83.
117 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
119 See, e.g., Taylor & Strafer, Attorney Fee Forfeiture: Can It BeJustified?, 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8, 43
(A.B.A. Spring 1986).
120 See United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 1987) ("we conclude with Harvey that
notice and a hearing are constitutionally required (i.e., as a matter of fifth amendment due process)
with respect to post-indictment restraining orders, but are not statutorily required"); United States
v. Their, 801 F.2d 1463 (if Rule 65 hearing applicable to CCE, not violative of due process); United
States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (exparte TRO under § 853 violated due
process; Rule 65 read into provision; hearing required to restrain property of defendant and third
party); United States v. Lewis, 59 F.2d 1316, 1324-27 (8th Cir. 1985) (exparte TRO under § 848
violated due process; Rule 65 read into provision; must find irreparable injury; solvent defendant
may not be denied choice of counsel, citing United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir.
1984)); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981) (government cannot rely on indict-
ment alone to establish the likelihood that assets are subject to forfeiture). But see United States v.
Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1886);
United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 195-96.
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The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden
of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the
.jury to judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence
adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions that may arise from
the fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other matters not
introduced as proof at trial. It is "an accurate, shorthand description
of the right of the accused to 'remain inactive and secure, until the
prosecution has taken up its burden and produced evidence and ef-
fected persuasion; . . .' 'an assumption' that is indulged in in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence." Without question, the presumption of
innocence plays an important role in our criminal justice system ...
[b]ut it has no application to a determination of the rights of [an ac-
cused] before his trial has ever begun. 12 1
Second, the due process argument focuses on the wrong amend-
ment. It is undisputed that in a civil "taking" situation, where the gov-
ernment deprives a person of the use of property, the due process
requirement of the fifth amendment requires that the individual be given
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.12 2 But while the 1984 Act adopts the idea of a restraining order
from the civil law, the restraint now operates in a criminal context that
focuses instead on the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment
changes the rules.
In Gerstein v. Pugh,123 the Supreme Court stated that it is the prob-
able cause requirement of the fourth amendment, not the due process
requirement of the fifth amendment, that defines the procedure or pro-
cess due for seizure of persons or property in a criminal case. 124 In de-
ciding what procedural safeguards are required in making a probable
cause determination under the fourth amendment the Court held that
"whatever procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and relia-
ble determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant
pretrial restraint ... " 125 A grand jury indictment provides a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause in the federal system.1 26
It may at first seem odd that in a civil context the due process of the
fifth amendment might invalidate an ex parte restraining order, while in a
121 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1978) (citations omitted).
122 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-90 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 339 (1969).
123 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
124 Id. at 122-25 n.27 ("civil procedures are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different con-
text of the criminal justice system"). See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 676-80 (1974) (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972) inapplicable to forfeitures);
Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398,401-02 (1921) (Brandeis,J.) ("The corporation cannot disable
itself from responding [to a prospective fine] by distributing its property among its stockholders and
leaving remediless those having valid claims.").
125 Id.
126 The Supreme Court has been reluctant to sustain challenges to the validity of grand jury
findings and indictments. In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), the Court stated that
"[aln indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grandjury... if valid on its face, is
enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more."
Id at 363 (footnote omitted). Costello held that an indictment is not invalidated by the grand jury's
consideration of credible hearsay. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S, 361 (1981), the Court
refused to dismiss an indictment where the government interfered with the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. Finally, in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974),'the Court denied a
fourth amendment challenge to the validity of an indictment.
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criminal proceeding the defendant need not be given the same right to
an adversarial hearing.1 27 But in a criminal matter the state must estab-
lish probable cause before any seizure. Probable cause is, in effect, either
the due process or a compelling interest permitting state seizure. Fur-
thermore, the deprivation cannot endure for an unreasonably long pe-
riod because the government must bring defendants quickly to trial. 128
Finally, the government has the highest burden of proof in a criminal
matter-proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution
mandates no greater protections.
While constitutional jurisprudence shows that the government may
rely solely on an indictment in its application for a restraining order, the
language of the 1984 Act does not require that courts grant restraining
orders on a showing of probable cause.129 In contrast is Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge or magistrate
to issue an arrest warrant if the government has shown probable
cause. 130 The 1984 Act operates in an area where civil property interests
and procedures begin to blend with necessary criminal procedures. Rec-
ognizing this, the statutes permit courts to accommodate both interests.
In United States v. Their,131 for example, while properly refusing to
find attorneys' fees absolutely exempt from forfeiture, the court ruled
that "the defendant's interest in obtaining counsel of his choice and the
possible adverse effects of a pretrial refusal to exempt defense counsel's
fees from forfeiture are factors that the district court must consider in
exercising its discretion to grant a pretrial injunction that restrains the
defendant's assets until conclusion of trial."' 3 2 The court correctly rec-
ognizes that under the 1984 Act it retains discretion to deny or modify a
request for an injunction. In its discretion it may look to factors besides
the government's interest. In cases where all of the defendants' assets
are subject to forfeiture so that not just their fourth amendment, but also
their fifth and the sixth amendment interests enter the picture, it may be
appropriate in the interest of justice, for courts to inquire into these in-
terests implicated-at least to ensure that probable cause could exist as
127 See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975). But see
id. at 125 n.27 .
128 The Federal Speedy Trial Act requires dismissal of the indictment (with prejudice in the
judge's discretion) if deadlines are not met. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, 3162 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp.
IV 1986).
129 The 1984 Act sets forth specific criteria for the issuance of restraining orders both before and
after indictment. A court may issue a pre-indictment restraint if the court is satisfied that there is a
substantial probability that the government will prevail at trial on the forfeiture issue; that if a re-
straining order is not entered the property will be destroyed, placed beyond the court's jurisdiction
or otherwise made unavailable; and that the need to maintain the property's availability outweighs
the hardship that issuance of a restraining order would have on any party against whom the order is
sought. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(l)(B)(i)-(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
130 FED. R. CRIM. P. R. 4(a) provides, in pertinent part: "If it appears from the complaint or from
an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the
defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it." (Emphasis added.)
131 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
132 801 F.2d. at 1474.
[Vol. 63:535
to the taint of the assets identified in the indictments.13 3 In these provi-
sions, the Congress, in its war against organized crime, provides to law
enforcement only procedures that the Supreme Court has already sanc-
tioned. As Part IV shows, the pretrial flexibility that the statute affords
the judiciary provides courts with a means to solve the alleged fee forfei-
ture problems.
IV. The Statutory Solution
Among other things, the defense bar has been concerned that sub-
jecting attorneys' fees to forfeiture will chill the attorney-client relation-
ship because attorneys will want to know as little as possible about their
clients in order to qualify as bona fide purchasers. 134 In fact, if courts
apply literally the government's argument, attorneys never could qualify
as bona fide purchasers because indictments would give them notice of
forfeiture. 135 Their clients would have to win in order for attorneys to
get paid. Either scenario might violate professional legal ethics.13 6 For-
tunately, both the language and the purpose of the statutes grant attor-
neys reasonable bona fide purchaser protection.
For example, in United States v. Jones,137 the Fifth Circuit took away
the government's discretion to deny bona fide purchaser protection to
attorneys based on the necessary knowledge of their clients' criminal
conduct. Almost remaining faithful to the language and intent of the stat-
ute, 3 8 the court ruled that it would be unreasonable to allow attorneys to
suffer less bona fide purchaser protection under the statute than granted
to the rest of the world just because attorneys are most likely to see the
indictments. 39
In Jones, the court ordered that the convicted defendant forfeit cer-
tain property. 140 The attorneys who represented the defendant at trial
filed a petition requesting a hearing to determine the status of their inter-
est in property that Jones pledged to them as compensation for legal
133 In discussing Costello and Calandra, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d
727, 732 (9th Cir. 1984),'asserted: "These cases suggest that challenges to indictments will not be
heard where they rest on objections to the evidence gathering process. They leave open the possi-
bility, however, of hearing challenges to indictments where improprieties occurred within the grand
jury process itself." In United States v. Their, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), the court correctly
concluded that the indictment itself constitutes a "strong showing" for continuing a freeze order,
although "the grand jury's finding of probable cause that the defendant should be tried for the crime
and its determination that certain assets are potentially forfeitable ... are not irrebutable." Id. at
1470.
134 See Note, The Criminal Forfeiture Provisions of the RICO and CCE Statutes: Their Application to Attor-
neys'Fees, 19 U. MIcH.J.L. REF., 1199, 1213 (1986).
135 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 9-111.511.
136 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.5(d)(2) (1983) provides: "A lawyer shall not
enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect.., a contingent fee for representing a defendant in
a criminal case." It is not clear, however, that the arrangement would be considered a contingent fee
agreement if the system imposes it.
137 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 844 F.2d 215 (1988).
138 The Fifth Circuit apparently still believes that Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is necessarily applicable to criminal forfeiture. 837 F.2d at 1334. See also United States v. Monsanto.
836 F.2d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 1987). But see supra note 133.
139 837 F.2d at 1334.
140 Id. at 1333.
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services rendered in connection with his defense. 14 In the post-convic-
tion hearing the district court, relying on United States v. Their",42 ex-
empted the property from forfeiture to pay the attorneys' reasonable and
legitimate legal fees.143
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning:
[D]efense attorney's necessary knowledge of the charges against his
client cannot defeat his interest in receiving payment out of the de-
fendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal services. We see no indi-
cation in the statute or the legislative history that Congress intended
to exclude attorneys from bringing a third-party claim for a reasonable
attorney's fee against potentially forfeitable assets in a post-conviction
hearing. This is not to say that a defendant's payment of fees will al-
ways immunize such fees from post-trial forfeiture, only that a defense
lawyer's knowledge of the charges against the client does not ipso
facto disqualify the attorney's claim to be a bona fide purchaser under
the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions. 144
Through a principled, objective interpretation of these statutes' "reason-
ably without notice" language, the court permits attorneys to qualify for
bona fide purchaser status although they know the government also
claims an interest in the asset(s). The language of the opinion permits
the reasonable conclusion that information defense attorneys acquire
within the scope of the particular criminal trial representation would not
invalidate a bona fide purchaser claim against forfeitable assets.' 45 As-
suming that the transfer of assets occurs when defendants retain attor-
neys, which is also when the attorney-client relationship begins, 1 46 the
Fifth Circuit's approach would permit most legitimate attorneys to keep
their fees. If, however, they knowingly participated in or otherwise facili-
tated a client's criminal conduct (e.g., "mob" attorneys), they probably
will know that assets might be subject to forfeiture independent of the
indictment. And the attorney-client privilege would not help these law-
yers qualify for bona fide purchaser protection under the statute. 147 In
either case, the government still would be permitted, because it may have
a vested, although unperfected interest in the assets used to pay the fee,
141 Id.
142 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986).
143 837 F.2d at 1333.
144 Id. at 1334.
145 Such a treatment would be similar, although not identical, to the treatment of the attorney-
client privilege. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to provide those seeking legal coun-
sel an opportunity to communicate freely in confidence with a lawyer wiihout fear of reprisal or
apprehension of compelled disclosure. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Chirac v.
Reinicker, 24 U.S. (I 1 Wheat.) 288, 294 (1826). But the scope of the privilege is limited by the scope
of the legitimate representation. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975). See generally
VIIIJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§§ 87-90 (3d ed. 1984); Note, Attorney-Client Communications of Criminal Defendants: Evidentiary and Con-
stitutional Protections, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 739 (1985).
146 But see U.S. A-rrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 9-111.501.
147 In Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1932), the Court said: "There is a privilege protect-
ing communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused.
A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have
no help from the law."
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to inquire into the reasonableness of the fee in order to ensure that as-
sets are not transferred fraudulently to attorneys. 148
If the court does not grant a pretrial restraining order, honest attor-
neys should have no fear of losing -their reasonable fees. If, on the other
hand, the government has been able to restrain all of a defendant's as-
sets, the defendant may still retain an attorney by pledging or assigning
his claim. 149
Best of all, at their discretion courts may properly provide attorneys
who would have qualified for post-conviction bona fide purchaser protection a pre-
trial guarantee that they will receive reasonable fees. Neither the lan-
guage nor the intent of the statutes prohibit attorneys from having their
clients petition courts to set aside some reasonable portion of their assets
at an early stage of the proceeding.150 These pretrial hearings, which
would effectively protect attorneys' interests, do not violate the language
of the 1984 Act because the language only prohibits third parties from
asserting their interests pretrial.15 1 Defendants-parties to the action-
would be the actual petitioners for pretrial forfeiture exemption., A pre-
trial hearing also would not violate the intent of the RICO and CCE stat-
utes because the only attorneys to whom courts can grant pretrial
exemption are those who also would have qualified under the statutes'
bona fide purchaser post-conviction protection. It is true that defendants
may retain attorneys with tainted money-money not theirs. But Con-
gress recognized and was willing to live with this "loophole" when it
wrote the necessary bona fide purchaser exemption into the 1984 Act.
V. Conclusion
The current uproar over criminal forfeiture indicates that forfeiture
works-it hurts. Certainly creative, forfeiture has become one of the
most effective attacks against the organized criminal activity currently
plaguing our society. Unfortunately, judges and attorneys, learned in
common law tradition that they. believe provides insufficient precedent
here, and apparently worried that even the possibility of fee forfeiture
catastrophically upsets the adversarial balance of the criminal justice sys-
tem, have approached this 'new body of law with hostile confusion.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
149 The statutes protect bona fide, purchasers. Black's Law Dictionary defines purchase as the
"[t]ransmission of property from one person to another by voluntary act and agreement, founded on
valuable consideration." H. BLAcK, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979). It includes taking
by sale, discount, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property. U.C.C. § 1-201(32). The term purchase includes any contract to
purchase or otherwise acquire. Securities Exchange Act § 3. The term "purchaser" means a person
who, for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, acquires an interest (other
than a lien or security interest) in property which is valid under local law against subsequent pur-
chasers without actual notice. I.R.C. § 6323(h). Thus, attorneys may qualify for bona fide purchaser
status before their services are actually rendered. But see U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 10, at
§ 9-111.501.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Their,
801 F.2d 1463, 1474-75, (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d at 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
151 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(k).
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In reality, the bar's concerns have been exaggerated. In two ways,
the text of the forfeiture provisions provides enough flexibility for the
judiciary to implement the law in a constitutional manner.
First, aside from the fact that the Criminal Justice Act provides free
representation to those unable to retain attorneys, the language of the
statute only permits courts to grant restraining orders-it does not man-
date their issuance. While it is clear that in the criminal context the prob-
able cause supporting the indictment is sufficient to permit restraint of
person or property, the courts have always had the authority to balance
hardships with respect to the scope and therefore the effect of the re-
straint. In this context, just as a court might be expected to exclude from
restraint sufficient assets to purchase necessities such as food, it might
also conclude that a privately retained attorney is a necessity in a com-
plete RICO or CCE prosecution. Unfortunately for the elite of the pri-
vate defense bar and their clients, the expensive attorneys are hardly
necessities if others will work for smaller fees. Still, such an approach
survives constitutional challenge.
A better approach permits the more qualified attorneys to continue
to make a sufficiently attractive income to remain in the criminal defense
field. While the Constitution does not guarantee a free market bar, as a
society in fear of totalitarianism we ought not eliminate an incentive for
bright individuals to engage in criminal defense work by making it rela-
tively unprofitable. These statutes do not. Fortunately, the criminal for-
feiture statutes only attempt to take the profit out of crime. Neither their
language, nor their intent precludes honest (noncriminal) attorneys from
qualifying for bona fide purchaser protection. Because, as the preceding
paragraphs argue the courts retain discretion to grant or modify re-
straining orders, defendants may petition courts pretrial to set aside a rea-
sonable fee (depending on the attorney) in order to guarantee payment.
The language of the statutes only prohibits nonparties from petitioning
pretrial. And no purpose of the statutes is frustrated because any bona
fide purchasing attorney would have qualified for the fee post-conviction
anyway.
Common sense, not the Constitution, solves this problem.
William R. Cowden
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